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ADINISTRATIvE LAw-DISQUALIFICATION OF TRIAL.
EXAMaNER-FAIURE TO RAISE ISSUE TIMELY
In a proceeding to set aside the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission's order and certificate of public convenience and necessity
for the extension of an existing motor carrier route, the three-
judge United States District Court for the Eastern District of Mis-
souri on the day appointed for hearing allowed an amendment
raising for the first time a contention that the Commission's action
was invalid for want of jurisdiction because the trial examiner
had not been appointed pursuant to § 11 of the Federal Administra-
tive Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1010. Upon proof that the appoint-
ment had not been made in accordance with that Act, the District
Court invalidated the order and certificate without considering the
merits of the issue tendered in the original complaint. 100 F. Supp
432. Upon appeal to the United States Supreme Court, held that
such an objection first raised on appeal to the courts is waived by
failure to raise the issue during the administrative proceeding un-
less the facts indicate that the agency concealed the nature of the
appointment or that information concerning the nature of the ap-
pointment was otherwise unavailable to the complaining party.
United States et al. v Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. 33 (1952).
In the absence of statutory restriction, the mere fact that a
member of an administrative tribunal has had prior contact with
a case does not disqualify him from acting in the formal pro-
ceedings. See: Phillips v. Securities and Exchange Commission,
153 F. 2d 27 (2d Cir. 1946); National Labor Relations Board v.
Botany Worsted Mills, 133 F. 2d 876 (3d Cir. 1943), cert. denied
319 U.S. 751 (1943); Farmer's Livestock Commission v. United
States, 54 F. 2d 375 (E.D. Ill., 1931). Even if such member took
an active part in the investigation leading to the proceedings, there
is no denial of due process. Brinkley v. Hassig, 83 F. 2d 351 (3d
Cir. 1936). However, Section 11 of the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act, supra, provides that a trial examiner in an ad-
ministrative proceeding shall not have any inconsistent duties. In
two leading cases, Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33
(1950), and Riss & Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 907 (1951), the
Supreme Court has sustained attacks on administrative action be-
cause of a violation of Section 11, supra.
In neither of these cases was the question of the disqualifica-
tion of the hearing officer raised at the administrative hearing;
however, unlike the principal case, in neither was the question of
timeliness of the objection raised. The Court now declares that
because the question was not raised at the administrative level,
the two earlier cases are not binding precedent on this point since
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the Court is not bound by a prior exercise of jurisdiction where
the issue was passed sub silentio. Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr.
Justice Douglas dissented in the principal case on the grounds
that the Wong case, supra, decided the question raised.
Although this decision may be argued to be inconsistent with
the holding in the Wang case, supra, it cannot be deemed incon-
sistent with the rule that prevails with respect to the timeliness
of an objection to a trial judge on the grounds of bias and preju-
dice or interest. A statute forbidding a disqualified judge to act
may be waived either expressly or impliedly by failure to make
timely objection. Coltrane v. Templeton, 106 F. 370 (4th Cir.
1901), Utz & D. Co. v. Regulator Co., 213 F. 315 (8th Cir. 1914).
State courts have likewise held that disqualification of a judge
for interest is waived unless objection is made at the earliest avail-
able opportunity. Tari v. State, 117 Ohio St. 481, 159 N.E. 594,
57 A.L.R. 284 (1927); Dotson v. Burchett, 301 Ky. 28, 190 S.W. 2d
697, 162 A.L.R. 636 (1945); Washington Fire Ins. Co. v. Hogan,
139 Ark. 130, 213 S.W. 7, 5 A.L.W. 1585 (1919). And it has been
held that even if the disqualification of the judge was unknown,
it is waived if not early raised unless it can be shown that the bias
and prejudice worked to the prejudice of the complaining party.
State v. Walls, 27 Ohio L. Abs. 545 (1938). In the principal case,
the Court pointed out that there was no indication that the com-
plaining party was in any way prejudiced by the action of the
trial examiner: "there is no suggestion that he exhibited bias,
favoritism or unfairness." Moreover, in neither the principal case
nor the Wong and Riss cases, supra, did the Court refer to the
provision of Section 7 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 1005, that, "... Any such officer may at any time withdraw if he
deems himself disqualified; and upon the filing in good faith of a
timely and sufficient affidavit of personal bias or disqualification
of any such officer, the agency shall determine the matter as a
part of the record and decision in the case . . . ." (Emphasis
supplied). When read together with Section 11, supra, this pro-
vision would seem to demand the result that the Court reached
in the principal case.
Alba L. Whiteside
Dom sTc RErLATIoNs - ToRT AcTIoNs BETWEEN
HusBiAD Am WIFE
The plaintiff alleged that she was negligently injured in a
club operated by the defendant, an unincorporated fraternal asso-
ciation. Her husband was a member of the association at the time
of the accident and, therefore, one of the defendants. The trial
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and appellate courts sustained a demurrer to the plaintiff's peti-
tion on the ground that it did not state a cause of action because
in Ohio a wife can not sue her husband for tort injuries. On ap-
peal to the Supreme Court, Held, reversed and remanded. The
common law unity of husband and wife has been abolished in
Ohio by OHio GEN. CODE §§ 7997 - 8002, 11245, 11591 which define
the rights of husband and wife; therefore, the plaintiff wife can
maintain an action of tort against an association of which her hus-
band had been a member. Datmm v. Elyria Lodge No. 465, Benevo-
lent Protective Order of Elks, et al., 158 Ohio St. 107, 107 N. E.
2d 337 (1952).
At common law, husband and wife were considered one per-
son and unable to sue each other. Phillips v. Barnet, 1 Q.B.D.
436 (1876); 30 C.J. 507. A married woman was not sui juris at
common law and was incapable of maintaining an action without
joinder of her husband. Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582 (U.S. 1858).
This doctrine of legal identity prevented the wife from suing
her husband in tort for personal injuries. Schultz v. Schultz, 89
N.Y. 644 (1882); Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427, 107 N.W. 1047
(1906). One of the main arguments for the disability is that if
such actions were allowed the peace and tranquility of the family
relationship would be disturbed. David v. David, 161 Md. 532, 157
AtI. 755, 91 A.L.R. 1100 (1932). See McCurdy, Torts between
Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HAv. L. REv. 1030 (1930).
At first equity, then legislation passed in the 19th Century
known as the Married Woman's Property Acts, gave the wife a
separate legal right to sue or be sued independently in certain
actions. Nearly all the states have legislation granting actions of
one type or another. VERER, AMEICiAN FAMILY LAW § 179 (1935).
The ability of the wife to sue her husband depends upon the
judicial interpretation of these statutes and the degree the courts
are willing to erode away the doctrine of legal identity. Wait v.
Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 475, 210 N.W. 823, 48 A.L.R. 276
(1926).
In Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910), the majority
of the United States Supreme Court construed the Married
Woman's Act of the District of Columbia, D. C. CODE § 43 (1929),
which gave the wife a right to sue or be sued as a feme sole, as
not giving her the right to sue her husband in tort. The majority
of the states have strictly construed their statutes as having no
effect upon the common law disability. Peters v. Peters, 156 Calif.
32, 103 Pac. 219 (1909); Furstenburg v. Furstenburg, 152 Md. 247,
136 Atl. 534 (1927); Furey v. Furey, 193 Va. 727, 71 S.E. 191 (1952);
160 A.L.R. 1406 (1946). Some states will not allow a wife to
maintain an action against her husband for an ante-nuptial tort.
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Patenaude v. Patenaude, 195 Minn. 523, 263 N.W. 546 (1935). A
strong minority of states have construed their statutes and consti-
tutions as allowing the wife an action against her husband for inten-
tional or negligent injuries. Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 98 Atl.
889 (1914); Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P. 2d 660
(1938); Brandt v. Keller, 413 Ill. 503, 109 N.E. 2d 729 (1953); Wait v.
Pierce, supra. In New York, tort actions between husband and
wife are expressly allowed by statute. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw. § 57
(1939). Though the Married Woman's Statutes grant the wife an
action in tort against her husband, it does not necessarily mean
that the husband also has an action. Fehr v. General Accident &
Life Insurance Co., 246 Wis. 228, 16 N.W. 2d. 787, 160 A.L.R. 1402
(1944), changed by statute. WIs. ST. § 246.075. Scholtens v. Schol-
tens, 230 N.C. 149, 52 S.E. 2d. 350 (1949).
The right to maintain an action between spouses or not is a
substantive right and part of the cause of action; therefore, the
lex loci governs as to substantive rights unless it contravenes the
public policy of the forum. Coster v. Coster, 289 N.Y. 438, 46 N.E.
2d. 509, 146 A.L.R. 702 (1943). States which do not allow actions
between spouses will not as a rule entertain suits for torts even
though permitted in the state where the tort occurred. Mertz v.
Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E. 2d. 597, 108 A.L.R. 1120 (1936); Kyle
v. Kyle, 210 Minn. 204, 297 N.W. 744 (1941).
In Phillips v. Graves, 20 Ohio St. 371, 5 Am. Rep. 675 (1870),
the Supreme Court of Ohio recognized both the common law
doctrine of legal identity and equity's concept of a separate legal
estate in the wife. This was modified in 1887 by statute, Omo
GEN. CODE § 8002-1 to 8002-8, which gave the wife the right to
maintain certain actions in the protection of her property. In State
v. Phillips, 85 Ohio St. 317, 97 N.E. 976 (1912), the Supreme
Court held that Orno GEN. CODE § 7995 to 8004 did not remove
the common law disability preventing criminal prosecution of the
wife for larceny of the husband's goods. This case was cited with
approval in Finn v. Finn, 19 Ohio App. 302, 23 Ohio L.R. 83 (1924),
and in Leonardi v. Leonardi, 21 Ohio App. 110, 153 N.E. 93 (1935),
where a wife was not allowed to sue her husband for injuries
received from the negligent operation of a car by the husband.
The plaintiff in the Finn case, supra, called attention to Omo
GEN. CODE § 11245 which provides that "A married woman shall
sue and be sued as if she were unmarried .... ." The appellate court
rejected this argument saying the enabling statutes referred to
were not intended by the legislature to confer a civil action in
tort between spouses.
The principal case reasons that in Ohio the pertinent statutes,
supra, and Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution had so
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"modified" the common law rule of identity that a wife could sue
her husband in tort. The court rejected the majority opinion of the
Thompson case, supra, and distinguished State v. Phillips, supra,
by limiting it to its facts which involved a criminal prosecution by
a husband against his wife for larceny. Though most courts are
emphatically opposed to creation of a crime by implication, the
holding in State v. Phillips, supra, seems untenable in light of the
principal case and the fact that the fiction that the personality of
the wife merges into that of the husband has been universally abol-
ished by statute or constitutional amendment. See State v. Herndon,
158 Fla. 515, 27 So. 2d. 833 (1946). The court in the principal case
called particular attention to the Courtney case, supra, in which the
position taken by most of the states is reviewed. The courts which
permit such actions feel that the old actions of divorce and criminal
prosecution for assault and battery are inadequate to protect the in-
terest of the wife.
Because of the peculiar facts of the case, the court possibly
could have allowed the action by considering the identity doctrine
not applicable to an unincorporated association. Benevolent asso-
ciations are liable for their actions either in a representative suit
or as an entity under the statute. High v. Supreme Lodge, 214
Minn. 164, 7 N.W. 2d. 675 (1943); 38 AM. Jur. 582; WRiGHn=TON,
UNIcopoRAm ASSOCrATIONS AND Busnq ss TRUSTS § 70 (1923).
Even though a wife has been denied the right to sue a partnership
in which her husband was a partner, Caplanz v. Caplan, 268 N.Y.
445, 198 N.E. 23, 101 A.L.R. 1223 (1935); Karalis v. Karalis, 213
Minn. 31, 4 N.W. 2d. 632 (1942), it is doubtful whether the de-
fendant association is governed by the law of partnership and that
the doctrine of the Caplan case is applicable. Normally such asso-
ciations are not organized for profit and are, therefore, governed
solely by the law of agency. Robbins v. Cook, 42 S.D. 136, 173 N.W.
445 (1919); cf, Koogler v. Koogler, 127 Ohio St. 57, 186 N.E. 725
(1933); 1 W LMSTON, CONTRACTS § 308 (1936). It is, therefore, pos-
sible that these associations or their members could be liable re-
gardless of the marriage bar.
The court in the principal case did not delve into this problem,
but decided to eliminate the identity doctrine altogether in the field
of torts, which constitutes a definite departure from the prior Ohio
holdings. See Comment, 13 Omo ST. L. J. 90 (1952). Outside of a
few actions for willful torts between estranged spouses, the most
prolific action will probably involve automobile negligence with
insurance in the background. Recovery will be barred in the great
bulk of the cases by the "guest" statutes and statutes like N. Y.
INS. LAw § 167 (3) which relieves the insurance companies of li-
ability in such actions unless expressly provided for in the policy.
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The principal case reflects the tendency of society to give the wife
greater independence from her husband, and it will be interesting
to see how far the courts and legislature will allow such actions
in the future.
Charles F. Johnston
EvEN E--EXmET Wrrn-ssEs-REvErsA OF TRIAL CouRT's RULING
In a malpractice action for the alleged negligent treatment of
a broken leg, plaintiff offered as an expert witness an elderly
specialist in gynecology licensed to practice in a neighboring state
who, although no longer able to do operative work, had kept abreast
of surgical and medical developments through observation and
reading. The trial court, declaring him not qualified as an expert,
declined to allow him to testify and, as plaintiff offered no other
witnesses, the action was dismissed. On appeal, held (2-1), revers-
ed, and a new trial ordered. The rejection of the witness was
"erroneous and constituted a mistaken use of discretion." Cathone
v. Warburton, 22 N.J. Super. 5, 91 A. 2d 518 (1952), affd, 11 N.J.
418, 94 A. 2d 680 (1953).
The decision was not startling; for it is well established that
appellate courts will review the use of discretion by trial courts in
rulings on the competency of expert witnesses, despite contrary
contentions that the appellate function is limited to the review of
the legal standards applied. Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal. 2d 749, 205 P. 2d
3 (1949); 32 C.J.S., EvIDENcE § 548; 3 JONES, EVIDENCE § 1318 (2d
Ed. 1926); See Note, 166 A.L.R. 1067 and cases cited. Contra: State
v. Bunk, 4 N.J. 461, 73 A. 2d 249 (1950); Bratt v. Western Air
Lines, Inc., 155 F. 2d 850 (10th Cir. 1946). Occasionally there is
a misleading tendency to see a problem of reviewability, undoubt-
edly furthered by Wigmore's insistence on reserving absolute final-
ity of decision to the trial judge, without review on appeal, 2 WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE § 561 (3d Ed. 1940), but the matter is essentially
a question of when and under what circumstances the appellate
court will reverse. A common, though not the only, statement of
the rule is that, "unless founded on some error of law, or on serious
mistake or abuse of discretion, the ruling of the trial court on this
preliminary question is not reversible." Burchett v. State, 35 Ohio
App. 463, 173 N.E. 301 (1930). Actually, such rulings are only in-
frequently disturbed on any ground, but the distinction between
incorrect standards of law and abuse or misuse of discretion is im-
portant since reversals on any but the former ground are extreme-
ly rare in occurrence.
Much of this restraint can be attributed to the reluctance on
the part of appellate courts to interfere with the exercise of the
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trial judge's discretion by substituting their judgment for his. Ac-
cordingly, they insist on a showing of abuse high enough in degree
and of such effect as to constitute error prejudicial to the appellant.
That the reviewing tribunal would have reached a different con-
clusion, or even that actual error has been demonstrated, will not
suffice to upset the ruling without the requisite finding of pre-
judicial error. Healy v. BilIias, 17 N.J. Super. 119, 85 A. 2d 527
(1951); Moeller v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 218 Minn. 353, 16 N.W. 2d
289 (1944); Cincinnati St. Ry. Co. v. Hickey, 29 Ohio App. 399,
163 N.E. 310 (1928). The degree of abuse necessary has been vari-
ously designated as "clear", Sinz v. Owens, supra, "palpable", Robi-
son v. Chicago, Great Western R. Co. (Mo. App.) 66 S.W. 2d 180
(1933), or "manifest", MODEL CODE Or EVIDENCE, RULE 105, CoM-
MENT.
What constitutes abuse, however, has not been completely
agreed upon. Nor can it be, since, after all, the matter by definition
is one of judicial discretion. The few attempts to establish a rule
have been in the area of the minimum amount of evidence neces-
sary to demonstrate a witness' qualifications. Robison v. Chicago,
Great Western R. Co., supra, states that palpable abuse would oc-
cur in allowing a witness to testify where no evidence of his qualifi-
cation had been presented; but a showing of 18 years experience
as a railroad engineer sufficed where the question was one of stop-
ping capacity of certain railroad air brakes. Earlier, in Katz v.
Delohery Hat Co., 97 Conn. 665, 118 Atl. 88 (1922), a witness with
30 years experience in the hat manufacturing business was con-
sidered qualified to testify as to the condition of the fur market
after the 1918 Armistice where qualification based on incompetent
or insufficient evidence would have constituted abuse of discretion.
More recently, 27 years service with a municipal fire department
was deemed sufficient for a fire chief to give an opinion that a
petroleum-base paint thinner could be ignited from sparks of an
emery wheel where substantial evidence was needed to support
the trial court's ruling. Humiston v. Hook, 86 Cal. App. 2d 101,
194 P. 2d 122 (1948). The qualification must affirmatively appear.
Byrd v. Virginian Ry. Co., 123 W. Va. 47, 13 S.E. 2d 273 (1941).
The principal case comes as one of the rare instances of re-
versal for misuse of discretion with the dissenting opinion ex-
pressing quite strongly the conflict of opinion on the point. Unlike
the great majority of cases, the witness tlere was rejected. Usually,
on the basis of some quantum of evidence, the expert is permitted
to testify, with the degree of his knowledge or skill going more to
the weight of his opinion than to its admissibility. Reliance is
placed on cross-examination for the exposition of any weaknesses
and on the jury for evaluation. Also, here, the trial judge's ruling
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was the sole issue brought for review, leaving no opportunity for
its relegation to a position subordinate to the more important alle-
gations of error usually present. After rejecting the theory that
the holder of a license to practice is qualified to give an opinion
merely by virtue of his holding the license, the court elaborated
on the difficulties attending the presentation of expert testimony.
Pointing out the extreme reluctance of many professional people,
particularly physicians, to appear and give opinion testimony, the
court indicated that the trial judge should have regard for the
difficulties of proof thus encountered, with a "reasonable" amount
of evidence sufficing to qualify the expert.
The dissent, beyond disagreeing with the majority's evaluation
of the facts, argued quite comprehensively the theory that appellate
review of the trial judge's rulings should be limited strictly to a
search for error of law. An indication of the unsettled state of
opinion in this area, however, is the citation of several New Jersey
cases in support of this view which, though not the identical cases
cited by the majority, are contemporaneous with them. The dissent
concluded with a statement of Wigmore's position that determina-
tions of the trial judge in such instances ought not to be reviewed
on appeal; this point was expressly disapproved in the affirming
opinion, supra. The case for review of discretion is also well pre-
sented in the concurring opinion in Hager v. Weber, 7 N. J. 201, 214,
81 A. 2d 155, 161 (1951).
There is a dearth of Ohio law on this point, but the suscepti-
bility to the split of opinion appearing in the principal case seems
considerably less. Although the most recent decision, Beam v. B. &
0. Ry., 77 Ohio App. 419, 68 N.E. 2d 159 (1945), would seem to
leave the matter in the air by the statement that the decision "will
not be disturbed unless clearly shown to be erroneous," especially
when this is recognized as a quotation from Bradford Glycerine Co.
v. Kizer, 113 F. 894 (6th Cir. 1902), but omitting the final phrase
"as a matter of law", there is respectable authority for a review
of discretion in Burchett v. State, supra. See also: 2 0. JuR., PART
2, OPINION AND EXPERT EvmECE § 676. Cincinnati St. Ry. Co. v.
Hickey, supra, and L.S. & M.S. Ry. Co. v. Terry, 14 O.C.C. 536,
7 O.C.D. 599 (1897). Both speak of the "reasonable" amount of dis-
cretion allowed the trial judge in the admission of expert and
opinion evidence but do this more in terms of whether the issue
is one in which such evidence is necessary or would be of assistance
to the trier of fact. That a strong showing of abuse is needed in
order to secure a reversal is made plain for all these Ohio decisions
clearly require a demonstration of prejudicial error to justify such
a ruling.
James E. Chapman
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ITCOmE TAxATIoN - GROSS INCO=M - SICK Bmxr-rs
RECEIVED FROM EVPLOyER
The plaintiff received from his employer sick benefits of $300
per month for six months while he was on a sick leave. He was tax-
ed on this amount as gross income. In this action for a refund the fed-
eral district court rendered a judgment in favor of the defendant.
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, held, reversed. Sick benefits are to be excluded from gross
income by Section 22 (b) (5) of the Internal Revenue Code. In re
Epmeier v. United States, 199 F. 2d 508 (7th Cir. 1952).
When an employee is disabled and unable to work and thus
receives accident or health insurance payments, these payments are
to be excluded from gross income in a personal income tax return.
INT. REv. CoDE § 22 (b) (5). The issue now is whether benefits re-
ceived by the employee while on sick leave but which are paid
directly by the employer and not by the insurance company should
also be excluded under the meaning of this statute.
The constitutionality of taxing such proceeds has never been
raised before a federal court. It might be argued that the payments
are intended as a substitute for the employee's earnings and should
be regarded as income. MAGILL, TAXABLE INcoA m 383 (1945). A
Scottish court held, however, that such payments do not consti-
tute taxable income. In that case the United States made payments
to a former private soldier whose war injuries caused his confine-
ment as a lunatic in Scotland. Laird v Com'rs., 14 Tax Cas. 395
(Ct. of Sess., 1929).
One month after the decision by the circuit court in the instant
case, the internal revenue commissioner issued a release in which
he stated that such payments would constitute income. He did
not mention the Epmeier case, supra, although his statements con-
cerned the issues of this decision. He said that self-insured plans
established by employers which provide for the payment of sickness
or accident benefits to employees do not become plans of insur-
ance just because they comply with state disability benefits statutes.
If payments do not fall under a plan of insurance they are not
exclusions and are subject to income tax. I.T. 4107, 1952-23-13961,
525 C.C.H. 6335.
Again, on March 26, 1953, the Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue issued a special release, in which he specifically mentioned the
Epmeier case, supra. The release states that the Internal Revenue
Department will not follow this decision, as it was decided on a
narrow ground and to follow this decision in future cases would
not be within the intention of Congress as to the meaning of this
statute. The federal act was originally passed at a time when in-
dividuals took out individual policies of insurance with insurance
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companies for compensation for personal injuries or sickness. The
premiums on these policies were paid out of taxable income. But
today, it has become common practice for employers to give this
type of compensation during periods of sick leave by making
direct payments to the employees. The commissioner thus contends
that it was the intention of Congress to exclude from gross income
only payments which are truly insurance payments. C.C.H. (March
26, 1953) 6136.
The court in the instant case, however, did not adopt these
arguments when it decided that insurance is a contract under
which one party for consideration promises to indemnify in case of
certain specified losses. It is a transfer of a risk from the insured
to the insurer. In this case there was no formal insurance policy
issued to the worker, but the company's intention to make such
payments was included in their documents. However, there is no
statutory requirement that a formal insurance policy must exist.
Although the employee paid no premiums, there was consideration
in the contract of employment. This protection was part of the com-
pensation running to the employee. This court stated that the pur-
pose of the statute, Section 22 (b) (5) of the Internal Revenue
Code, was to relieve the employee of the burden of paying income
tax on benefits he receives while sick for the purpose of combat-
ing that illness.
There is thus a problem confronting the Bureau. They must
make a decision on how far they can go in exempting compensa-
tion merely because the payments are received during a period of
illness. If the employee is simply getting paid whether he is sick
or well, can we call this health insurance?
Even if the commissioner's contention is correct that it was not
the original intention of Congress to exclude this type of payment
from the gross income, it is evident that the customs have changed
since that statute was enacted and this type of arrangement is
common practice today. From the reports of the commissioner it
is apparent that the Bureau does not intend to follow this case.
Therefore, payments made directly to an employee while on sick
leave by his employer are to be subject to income tax. However,
if a similar case were presented and appealed to a federal court,
the court would probably follow the decision of the Epmeier case,
supra, and again overrule the commissioner.
Carl E. Juergens
NEGLIGENCE -LIABILITY OF RuRAL _ABUTTING LANDowNmis
FOR TREES FALLING INTO THE HIGIiWAY
While plaintiff's decedent was operating his truck along a rural
state highway, limbs from a decayed tree overhanging the highway
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fell on the truck causing decedent to lose control. The truck struck
a tree, with decedent's death resulting from the injuries he sus-
tained. In his action for the wrongful death, plaintiff alleged that
defendant had knowledge of the tree's dangerous condition. De-
fendent's demurrer was sustained on the ground that the petition
did not state a cause of action. Held, reversed. Although a rural
landowner has no duty to inspect, an owner having knowledge,
actual or constructive, of a patently defective condition of a tree
must use reasonable care to prevent harm to a person lawfully
using the highway. Hay v. Norwalk Lodge No. 730, B.P.O.E., et al.,
92 Ohio App. 14, 109 N.E. 2d 481 (1952).
Historically, an abutting landowner owed no duty to travelers
on the highway for the natural condition of his premises. Miller v.
City of Detroit, 156 Mich. 630, 121 N.W. 490 (1909); PaossEa oN
TORTS § 76 (1941). In England and the urban areas of this country
an exception to the rule was made for patently defective trees that
fell into the highway if the owner knew, or should have known
of their dangerous condition. Caminer et al. v. Northern & London
Investment Trust, Ltd., 2 K.B. 64, 11 A.L.R. 2d 617 (1949); Brown
v. Milwaukee Terminal Ry. Co., 199 Wis. 575, 227 N.W. 385 (1929);
Smith et al. v. Bonner, 63 Mont. 571, 208 Pac. 603 (1922); Weller v.
McCormick, 52 N.J.L. 470, 19 Atl. 1101 (1890). Many statutes have
imposed a duty on municipalities and other governmental bodies to
protect travelers from dangerous trees. See notes, 14 A.L.R. 2d 186;
60 C.J.S. 527; 40 C.J.S. 301.
In rural areas, however, the rule of non-liability is still applied
to dangerous trees abutting the highway. Chambers v. Whele, 44
F. 2d 340, 72 A.L.R. 611 (4th Cir. 1930); Zacharias v. Nesbitt, 150
Minn. 369, 185 N.W. 295, 19 A.L.R. 1016 (1921); see notes, 49
A.L.R. 840; 11 A.L.R. 2d 626. There are two basic arguments for re-
taining rural non-liability. The first is the great burden imposed on
the rural owner if he must inspect all his trees. The second, that
many states have statutes imposing a duty on the governmental
agency in charge of maintenance of the highways to care for defec-
tive trees.
The rule of rural non-liability has not been universally ac-
cepted, for in Delaware an abutting owner of a suburban forest
was held liable for injuries to a traveler on the highway resulting
from the fall of limbs from a decayed tree. Brandywine Hundred
Realty Co. v. Cotillo, 55 F. 2d 231 (3rd Cir. 1931). A trial court in
Pennsylvania in a case that is quite similar factually to the principal
case held that even if there is a statutory duty on the state high-
way department to supervise trees, it does not excuse the land-
owner, and he will be liable if he had constructive notice of the
dangerous condition of the tree. Falco v. Bryn Mawr Trust Co.,
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Adm'r, 43 Montg. Co. L.R. 41, 10 Pa. D. & C. 115 (1927). A few
courts have even said that a defective tree should be treated like
an artificial structure, in which case the liability is absolute.
Medeiros v. Honomu Sugar Co., 21 Hawaii 155 (1912); Patterson
v. Canadian Robert Dollar Co. (dissent), 41 B.C. 123 (1929). If
the defect is caused by the active negligence of the owner, or some-
one with the owner's consent, the owner will be liable to the user
of the highway. Nagle v. Brown, 37 Ohio St. 7 (1881); Miller v.
Jacobs, 249 N.Y. 577, 164 N.E. 590 (1928); Ver-Vac Bottling Co. v.
Henson, 147 Md. 267, 128 Atl. 48 (1925).
The court in the principal case first ruled that the plaintiff
could not sue the unincorporated organization as an entity, or the
trustees thereof as individuals, before reaching the instant problem
- the liability of an abutting landowner for trees which cause in-
juries to a traveler on the highway. The case is one of first im-
pression in Ohio, although an earlier case discussed the problem
while deciding on another point. Gschwind v. Viers, 21 Ohio App.
124, 152 N.E. 911 (1925). The opinion points out that it makes
no difference whether the tree was in the right of way or not,
since there is no duty on the state highway department to care
for trees, (although the director of highways has the right to trim
and maintain trees in the highway. Omo REv. CODE § 5501.15
(1178-6).). This leaves inapplicable in Ohio the argument against
imposing a duty on rural landowners that there is a statutory duty
on highway officials to maintain trees. The case seems rather like
a nuisance case, not nuisance per se, but knowingly allowing a
dangerous condition to remain on one's premises. Even in England
there is no liability for latent defects in trees, and there is much
support for the court's holding that a tree is not an extra-hazardous
possession. Noble v. Harrison, 2 K.B. 332, 49 A.L.R. 833 (1926);
Miller v. City of Detroit, supra; Caminer et al. v. Northern & Lon-
don Investment Trust, Ltd., supra.
The court also takes a negligence approach by declaring: "An
owner of property abutting the highway has the obligation to use
reasonable care to keep his premises in such condition as not to
endanger travelers in their lawful use of the highway," and, "the
owner is responsible because in the management of his property
he has not acted as a reasonably prudent landowner would act."
The problem then becomes: what is reasonable? It is expressly stat-
ed that there is no duty to inspect, and the tree in question must
be patently defective. But, the court in the syllabus uses the phrase
"constructive knowledge", and in the opinion says: "If the danger
is apparent, which a person can see witlh his own eyes, and he fails
to do so with the result that injury results to a traveler on the way,
the owner is responsible ... ." The phrase "constructive knowledge"
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has never been defined in Ohio before this decision. Other courts
have defined it as: "Knowledge which could be acquired by the
exercise of ordinary care," Luck v. Buffalo Lakes, 144 S.W. 2d 672
(1940), or, "Where general observation by inspection or otherwise
should have revealed such defects." Brown v. Green, (Del.) 1 Pen-
newell 532, 42 AtI. 991 (1898). Constructive knowledge and the
lack of a duty to inspect seem to be conflicting principles. Con-
structive knowledge, as defined by the court, would indicate that
if the owner should have seen the defect and failed to do so, he
would be liable. On the other hand, a lack of duty to inspect tends
to indicate that actual knowledge is necessary to impose responsi-
bility. This presents the problem of what would be the decision in a
fact situation similar to this case except that the owner did not
know, but should have known, of the dangerous condition of the
tree.
Although the case says there is no duty to inspect, this case
can be fairly interpreted as holding that if a rural owner knows,
or should know, of a patently defective condition of a tree, he will
be responsible. This adopts the English and the urban rule for the
rural areas of Ohio.
David Carroll
PLEADING - SIAIm - METmoD OF PROOF
Plaintiff, a lawyer, sued his client in quantum meruit and on a
written contract for services rendered. Defendant answered by set-
ting up an oral release and by a general denial. Plantiff moved that
these defenses be stricken as sham and that judgment be rendered
on the pleadings. Held, judgment granted. In determining what a
sham pleading is the court may consider pleadings, affidavits, ex-
hibits, depositions and evidence on motion to strike. Metzenbaum v.
Lyman, 49 Ohio Op. 167, 108 N.E. 2d 869 (1952).
A sham pleading has been defined as a pleading good in form,
but false in fact and not pleaded in good faith. White v. Calhoun,
83 Ohio St. 401, 94 N.E. 743 (1911), 31 0. Jun. 892. At common
law, a sham pleading was subject to a motion to strike. 72 Am. Dec.
521. Some states have taken statutory cognizance of sham plead-
ing. CLARK, LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 87 (1947). Other jurisdictions
have adopted summary judgment statutes. RuLE 56 (C) FED. RULEs
CIv. Poc., CLARK, LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 88 (1947). While the
Ohio General Code makes no express statutory reference to sham
pleadings, it specifically allows a motion to strike a pleading. OrIo
GEN. CODE § 11375. In the absence of a statute, it is often held that
the court has an inherent power, existing at common law, to strike
sham pleadings. Butterick Publishing Co. v. Smith, 112 Ohio St.
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73, 146 N.E. 898 (1925); White v. Calhoun, supra (the leading Ohio
case on sham). A contra view has been taken. Broocks v. Muirhead,
221 N.C. 466, 20 S.E. 2d 273 (1942); Schottenfels v. Marsmun, 16
Ohio App. 78 (1922) (apparently ignoring White v. Calhoun, su-
pra).
However, there is a split of authority over the means available
to a court in determining whether the pleading is sham. At com-
mon law, extrinsic evidence, such as affidavits, was admissible. 72
Am. Dec. 521. Some jurisdictions today require that proof of a sham
be determined solely from the pleading itself or from facts within
the judicial knowledge of the court. McDonald v. Pincus, 13 Mont.
83, 32 P. 283 (1893); Reed v. Neu-Pro Construction Corp., 226
App. Dec. 70, 234, N.Y.S. 400 (1929), abrogated by statute, N.Y.
C.P.R. 103 (1944). Under this view, extrinsic evidence is excluded
in proving a sham because "such a practice seems to lead toward
a dangerous and unwarranted encroachment upon the right of
trial..." McDonald v. Pincus, supra.
Other jurisdictions, taking a contra view, admit extrinsic evi-
dence such as affidavits, Sheets v. Ramer, 125 Minn. 98, 145 N.W.
787 (1914), Goldberg v. Fisher, 11 N.J. Misc. 657, 168 Atl. 232
(1933); allegations of the movant, Cook v. Ramsey, 322 IlM. App.
671, 54 N.E. 2d 624 (1944); depositions, Felder v. Pugh, 53 Ohio L.
Abs. 90, 81 N.E. 2d 639 (1949); or evidence in such manner as the
court may direct, Burkhalter v. Townsend, 139 S.C. 324, 138 S.E.
34 (1927). This is also the English rule. Remmington v. Scoles, 2
Ch. 1 (1897). In jurisdictions which have adopted summary judg-
ment legislation the statutes usually specifically provide for use of
affidavits, pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file. RuLE 56
(C) FED. RuLES Civ. PRoc., CLARK, LAw OF CODE PLEADING § 88
(1947).
Courts which allow extrinsic evidence do so on the basis that
the right to a trial by jury is contingent on the presentation of a
justicable issue, Barker v. Foster, 29 Minn. 166, 12 N.W. 460 (1882),
and the court has the right to determine its existence in such man-
ner as it may direct. 72 Am. Dec. 521.
However, courts which allow extrinsic evidence are careful to
provide a full and fair hearing, 48 COL. L. REv. 780 (1948), by re-
quiring that if affidavits are used there must be an opportunity for
confrontation and cross-examination, Zinsmaster Baking v. Com-
mander Milling Co., 200 Minn. 128, 273 N.W. 673 (1937), Parish
Asschu Properties Inc., 247 Wis. 166, 19 N.W. 2d 276 (1945); by re-
fusing to allow controversial issues of fact to be determined by af-
fidavits, Kirk v. Welch, 212 Minn. 300, 3 N.W. 2d 426 (1942), Golden
v. Universal Indemnity Ins. Co., 117 N.J. Law 192, 187 Atl. 163
(1942); and by requiring that the party alleging the sham carry the
1953]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
burden of proof, Scottish Rite Co. v. Salkowitz, 119 N.J. Law 558,
197 Atl. 43 (1938).
By dictum, the leading case on sham in Ohio indicated that
depositions were admissible, White v. Calhoun, supra. More recent
decisions have permitted depositions, Felder v. Pugh, supra, af-
fidavits, exhibits and sworn evidence. Butterick Publishing Co. v.
Smith, supra.
Until a decision is obtained from a higher tribunal, the principal
case indicates that Ohio trial courts, in considering the question of
sham, may rather liberally allow extrinsic evidence to be intro-
duced to determine if an answer, good on its face, does present a
justicable issue.
However, notwithstanding specific judicial decisions granting
authority to determine sham pleadings, White v. Calhoun, supra,
Ohio trial courts generally refuse even to consider the question
of sham but instead allow the defendant to file an answer, thereby
needlessly extending the litigation. The best solution to this prob-
lem would seem to be the enactment of a summary judgment
statute, specifically granting the authority and stating the means
by which the courts could determine sham pleading.
Earl E. Mayer, Jr.
STAT= TAXATION - REAL PROPERTY - CONSTITUTIONALITY
or TuRNPn EXEMPTIoN STATUTE
Omo REv. CODE § 5537.20 (1212), Turnpike Projects, states:
"The exercise of the powers granted by this act will in all respects
be for the benefit of the people of the state.., and as [such], the
commission shall not be required to pay any taxes... upon ... any
property acquired ... under the provisions of this act.. . ." The At-
torney General has declared, following this statute, that real prop-
erty so acquired is exempt from taxation and that "it would be
difficult to perceive how any argument could be successfully ad-
vanced as to the unconstitutionality" of this section under the Ohio
Constitution. 1953 Ohio Ops. Att'y Gen., #2840. Omo CoNsT. ART.
XII, § 2, states, ". .. general laws may be passed to exempt burying
grounds, public school houses, houses used exclusively for public
worship, institutions used exclusively for charitable purposes, and
public property used exclusively for any public purpose. . . ." (Em-
phasis supplied.)
It is evident, upon examination of the last phrase, that there is
no question but that turnpike property is public property, since
OIno REV. CODE § 5537.07 (1207) states: "... title [of property]
shall be in the state." Nor is there a question of public purpose,
since the court, influenced by § 5537.20, supra, has declared the
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Ohio Turnpike Commission to be a public organization created for
a public purpose. State, ex rel Kauer v. Defenbacher, 153 Ohio St.
268, 91 N.E. 2d 512 (1950). However, a question does arise as to
whether all the land acquired by the Turnpike Commission is used
exclusively for a public purpose. The adverb "exclusively," which
appears three times in ART. XII, § 2, supra, preceding the phrases,
"public worship charitable purposes," and "public purpose," has re-
ceived considerable construction by the courts.
Early public worship cases received a rather strict interpreta-
tion of "exclusively," although recently the court has said it should
receive a "reasonable", not literal construction. In re The Bond Hill-
Roselawn Hebrew School, 151 Ohio St. 70, 84 N.E. 2d 270 (1949);
Mussio v. Glander, 149 Ohio St. 423, 79 N.E. 2d 233 (1948). In
charity cases involving income producing activities, such as hos-
pitals, YMCA's, etc., again the court has not required a literally
exclusive use for charity, if the profit is not for the pecuniary
advantage of those involved, and if the main objective is for the
purpose allowed by the Constitution. Golman v. The Friars Club,
et al, 158 Ohio St. 185, 107 N.E. 2d 518 (1952); Battelle Memorial
Institute v. Dunn, 148 Ohio St. 53, 73 N.E. 2d 88 (1947); O'Brien,
Treasurer v. The Physicians Hospital Association, 96 Ohio St. 1,
116 N.E. 975 (1917); Cleveland Osteopathic Hospital v. Zangerle,
153 Ohio St. 222, 91 N.E. 2d 261 (1950); Goldman v. Robert E.
Bentley, Post No. 50, American Legion, 158 Ohio St. 205, 107 N.E.
2d 528 (1952); The Welfare Federation of Cleveland v. Glander,
146 Ohio St. 408, 64 N.E. 2d 813 (1945); American Committee of
Rabbinical College of Telshe, Inc. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 156 Ohio
St. 376, 102 N.E. 2d 589 (1951); The College Preparatory School
For Girls v. Evatt, 144 Ohio St. 408, 59 N.E. 2d 142 (1945).
Public property cases seem to dwell upon whether or not there
is a private use of the property, and hold the use to be not ex-
clusive if it is for private use or gain. The main category dealing
with denial of exemptions has been municipalities operating in a
proprietary capacity. City of Cleveland v. Board of Tax Appeals,
153 Ohio St. 97, 91 N.E. 2d 480 (1950); Zangerle v. City of Cleve-
land, Division of Municipal Transportation, 145 Ohio St. 347, 61
N.E. 2d 720 (1945); Dayton Metropolitan Housing Authority v.
Evatt, 143 Ohio St. 10, 53 N.E. 2d 896 (1944). The balance of the
cases have involved public owners renting real estate to private
persons. Pfeiffer, Trustee of Akron Public Library v. Jenkins, 141
Ohio St. 66, 46 N.E. 2d 767 (1943); Division of Conservation and
Natural Resources of Ohio v. Board of Tax Appeals, 149 Ohio St.
33, 77 N.E. 2d 242 (1948). The trend in public property cases seems
to be that there must be an exclusive public use whose main ob-
jective is a public purpose, and not merely public benefit, conven-
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ience, or welfare. Pfeiffer, Trustee of Akron Public Library v.
Jenkins, supra; City of Toledo v. Jenkins, 143 Ohio St. 141, 54 N.E.
656 (1944).
Along the 241 mile length of the turnpike, the commission will
lease land to profit-making service station and restaurant owners,
who will be the users of the property. This is not unlike the case of
City ofDayton v. Haines, Aud., 156 Ohio St. 366, 102 N.E. 2d 290
(1951); Noted, 13 Oieo ST. L. J. 540. Directly, and by analogy, the
foregoing cases suggest several possible holdings in regard to this
fact. First, these concessions could indicate a non-exclusive use
of the property, and as such contaminate the whole turnpike pro-
ject, thus denying any exemption. Mussio v. Glander, supra; Pfeif-
fer, Trustee of Akron Public Library v. Jenkins, supra; City of
Cleveland v. Board of Tax Appeals, supra. Secondly, service sta-
tion and restaurant property could be classifed as entities separate
from the roadbed, berms and ditches, therefore, an exemption al-
lowance could be made for all property except the actual plots
leased to the service stations and restaurants. Trustees of the
Church of God of Cleveland v. Board of Tax Appeals, 159 Ohio St.
517, 112 N.E. 2d 633 (1953); Omo RE. CoDE. § 5713.04 (5560);
see also City of Toledo v. Jenkins, supra. Thirdly, service stations
could be considered necessities, and thus exempt, In re The Bond
Hill-Roselawn Hebrew School, supra, Goldman v. The Friars Club,
supra; while restaurants might be held taxable, either because they
are not necessities, or because they house strictly profit-making
souvenir shops, City of Cleveland v. Board of Tax Appeals, supra.
Fourthly, these concessions could be considered incidental and
necessary to the operation of the turnpike and therefore carry the
exemption along with it. Goldman v. The Friars Club, supra; In re
the Bond Hill-Roselawn Hebrew School, supra; City of Toledo v.
Jenkins, supra.
Other questions can be answered in a more definite manner.
For example, the fact that the public has to pay for the use of the
turnpike, and that the bondholders receive interest, does not
threaten exemption. City of Toledo v. Jenkins, supra; Goldman v.
The Friars Club, supra. Also the argument that the property should
not be exempt until actually used for the public purpose, ie., until
the turnpike is built, was squarely met in Board of Education of
City School District of Cincinnati v. Board of Tax Appeals, 149
Ohio St. 564, 80 N.E. 2d 156 (19-48), where the court held such
property exempt, saying, "... a distinction must be made in the
exemption of private property ultimately used for charitable pur-
poses and property purchased by public authorities for a public
purpose and being prepared to serve the public use." (Emphasis
supplied.)
[Vol. 14
1953] RECENT DECISIONS 347
The attorney general's opinion concludes with the statement
that because most of the denials of exemptions for public property
are for municipalities operating in a proprietary capacity, and since
the proprietary-governmental distinction is not made at the state
level, or even if it were the court has declared the Turnpike Com-
mission to be performing a governmental function, "no successful
challenge of the constitutionality of (5537.20) could be made." It
is submitted that the problem of turnpike property exemption goes
beyond the proprietary-governmental problem and involves a de-
cision on the scope of the word "exclusively."
John A. Jenkins



